

Confidential

DGLD Token Smart Contracts - Base

Final Security Audit

Confidential
October 2025

Executive Summary

This blockchain security audit covers DGLD repository

<https://github.com/goldtokensa/gtsa-base-smart-contracts> , October 2025.

Code revision under audit: eb9b5aeaf78713a19659635653c36b51499ff54d

Updated code revision: 82cbf9c76064e5666dece5e88021f3b1e913d515

Issues Found

- 0 critical issues ;
- 0 high severity issues ;
- 2 low severity issues ;
- 6 comments.

Key Audit Results

- 2 low severity issues resolved,
- 6 comments resolved

Issues Severity	Found	Resolved	Remaining
Critical	0	0	0
High	0	0	0
Low	2	2	0
Comments	6	6	0

DGLD Token Mainnet address: 0xA9299C296d7830A99414d1E5546F5171fA01E9c8

DGLD Token TESTNET Base L2 address:

0xd02f50E1017F493ffffa70c8fcf09e349e11d6c9

Audit result: Pass

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1 Methodology

1.1 Audit Result

Jita's current methodology does not score audits, as such scores can be subjective, easy to manipulate, create a false sense of security and mislead people into comparing audits and security scores.

Instead, the final audit is only assigned a value **PASS** or **FAIL**.

Audit Result	
PASS	The issues found by the auditor(s) have all been resolved or explained by the development team.
FAIL	Some of the issues found by the auditor(s) have not all been resolved or explained by the development team.

1.2 Issues Severity Evaluation

The following section presents the audit findings.

Each issue is located as precisely as possible in the codebase, a description gives more information on the problem, and one or more recommendations are provided.

The client answer to each issue is included.

Each issue risk severity is estimated following the OWASP risk rating methodology and is assigned an overall risk severity which can take one of four values:

Issue Overall Risk Severity	
Critical	The issue compromises the project and must be fixed.
High	The issue is either very likely with low impact, or unlikely but with a big impact on the business. The issue must be fixed.
Low	The issue does not compromise the project, or it has a potentially minor impact on the system operation.
Comment	The issue does not compromise the project.

The issue overall risk severity is evaluated based on two metrics:

- 1) the likelihood of the issue being exploited (technical feasibility of exploit) and
- 2) the technical/business/financial impact of the issue.

An issue's overall risk severity is an estimate and may be revised higher or lower by the client company based on their own estimates of business impact.

2 Scope of Work

2.1 DGLD Base L2 Token

2.1.1 Github repositories

- `git@github.com:goldtokensa/gtsa-base-smart-contracts.git`
Base L2 token for DGLD
Git revision `eb9b5aeaf78713a19659635653c36b51499ff54d`

2.2 Assumptions and limitations

2.2.1 Time and version reliance

The security audits are conducted within a specified time frame and are reliant on the specific version of the target code, system and information provided by the client, its affiliates, or its partners. Therefore, the list of identified vulnerabilities and security issues identified during the audit should not be considered comprehensive and exhaustive. The audit results do not imply any guarantee that all potential vulnerabilities, flaws, or defects have been detected.

2.3 Disclaimer

Jita does not warrant that the Deliverables will identify all vulnerabilities. The Deliverables shall not be considered as a final and sufficient assessment regarding the utility and safety of the code, bug-free status, or any other contract statements.

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This audit is not financial advice.

2.4 Copyright

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3 Audit Findings

3.1 /src

3.1.1 Low: Solidity language version pinning

3.1.1.1 Severity

Low

3.1.1.2 Files

```
src/DGLDToken.sol
src/UpgradeableOptimismMintableERC20.sol
src/PausibleWithAccess.sol
src/Blacklistable.sol
```

3.1.1.3 Functions

```
pragma solidity ^0.8.15;
```

3.1.1.4 Description

The solidity language version is set to 0.8.15 or above.

This allows developers to use different compiler versions, which can produce different bytecode versions.

Upstream files from the project use version pinning.

3.1.1.5 Recommendation

Use version pinning as follows:

```
pragma solidity 0.8.15;
```

3.1.1.6 Customer

This issue is addressed by configuring the Solidity version in foundry.toml.

```
solc_version = "0.8.15"
```

3.1.2 Low: minor risk of storage layout collisions during upgrades

3.1.2.1 Severity

Minor

3.1.2.2 Files

```
src/DGLDToken.sol
src/UpgradeableOptimismMintableERC20.sol
```

src/PausibleWithAccess.sol
src/Blacklistable.sol

3.1.2.3 Functions

```
uint256[50] private __gap;
```

3.1.2.4 Description

OpenZeppelin 4.x Proxy pattern uses an empty array of arbitrary size N at the end of an upgradeable smart contract. This allows developers to add up to N new state variables in future versions of the smart contract. The developer could make a mistake in a future version and still cause a collision. This is a low probability error and this pattern is recommended by Open Zeppelin 4.x.

3.1.2.5 Recommendation

Consider migrating to Open Zeppelin 5.x and Solidity 0.8.20 which introduce namespaced storage layout (see ERC-7201). This approach replaces the gap array with structs.

More info:

<https://www.openzeppelin.com/news/introducing-openzeppelin-contracts-5.0#Simplifications>

3.1.2.6 Customer

Resolved

3.1.3 Comment: replace String error messages with CustomErrors

3.1.3.1 Severity

Comment

3.1.3.2 Files

src/Blacklistable.sol

3.1.3.3 Functions

```
modifier notBlacklisted(address _account) {
    require(!blacklisted[_account], "Blacklistable: account is
blacklisted");
    _;
}
```

3.1.3.4 Description

String error messages are non-standardized and gas consuming.

3.1.3.5 Recommendation

Use CustomErrors instead of require statements.

This lets developers standardize error processing and optimize gas consumption:

```
modifier notBlacklisted(address _account) {
    if (!blacklisted[_account]) {
        revert BlacklistedAccount(account);
    }
    _;
}
```

3.1.3.6 Customer

Resolved in fabaf64

3.1.4 Comment: replace String error messages with CustomErrors

3.1.4.1 Severity

Comment

3.1.4.2 Files

src/UpgradeableOptimismMintableERC20.sol

3.1.4.3 Functions

```
/// @notice Internal function to check bridge authorization
function _onlyBridge() internal view {
    require(msg.sender == BRIDGE, "OptimismMintableERC20: only
bridge can mint and burn");
}
```

3.1.4.4 Description

String error messages are non-standardized and gas consuming.

3.1.4.5 Recommendation

Use CustomErrors instead of require statements.

This lets developers standardize error processing and optimize gas consumption:

```
modifier notBlacklisted(address _account) {
    if (!blacklisted[_account]) {
        revert BlacklistedAccount(account);
    }
}
```

```
    -;  
}
```

3.1.4.6 Customer

Resolved in fabaf64

3.1.5 Comment: typo in file name

3.1.5.1 Severity

Comment

3.1.5.2 Files

src/PausibleWithAccess.sol

3.1.5.3 Functions

N.A.

3.1.5.4 Description

File name is PausibleWithAccess.sol

3.1.5.5 Recommendation

Rename to PausableWithAccess.sol

3.1.5.6 Customer

Resolved in 8bd7d79

3.1.6 Comment: minimize changes to upstream file version

3.1.6.1 Severity

Comment

3.1.6.2 Files

src/PausibleWithAccess.sol

3.1.6.3 Functions

```
pragma  
Import {PausableUpgradeable}
```

3.1.6.4 Description

This file comes from

<https://github.com/coinbase/extended-optimism-mintable-token/blob/master/src/roles/PausableWithAccess.sol>

There are minor changes that may not be necessary.

Minimizing changes from third-party files is a good practice and facilitates code reviews and updating to the latest version.

3.1.6.5 Recommendation

Revert changes to pragma (use version pinning for Solidity)

Add spaces to both imports smart contracts.

3.1.6.6 Customer

This issue is deprecated after migrating to OpenZeppelin 5 and Solidity 0.8.20.

3.1.7 Comment: minimize changes to upstream file version

3.1.7.1 Severity

Comment

3.1.7.2 Files

src/Blacklistable.sol

3.1.7.3 Functions

```
pragma
Import {AccessControlUpgradeable}
Modifier notBlacklisted(...)
```

3.1.7.4 Description

This file comes from /centrehq/centre-tokens/... and contains non-meaningful changes.

It is better practice to preserve the original file if possible, both for audits and for future updates / version tracking.

3.1.7.5 Recommendation

- Maintain solidity language version pinning
- Preserve spacing in `import { AccessControlUpgradeable }`
- Preserve formatting for modifier `notBlacklisted` (multi-line)

3.1.7.6 Customer

This issue is deprecated after migrating to OpenZeppelin 5 and Solidity 0.8.20.

3.1.8 Comment: _admin management key

3.1.8.1 Severity

Comment

3.1.8.2 Files

DGLDToken.sol

3.1.8.3 Functions

initialize()

3.1.8.4 Description

Parameter _admin is an Ethereum address that gets assigned all critical security roles: admin, pauser, blacklister.

That address is critical for correct business operation.

3.1.8.5 Recommendation

Make sure to use a SAFE multi sig wallet, another multi-sig wallet or a MPC wallet configured so that at least two signatures are required to authorize any function call using that key. Besides, it must be also possible to restore the wallet if one of the keys is lost.

Going further, consider adding a separate key for roles PAUSER and BLACKLISTER for day to day operations if these functions are frequently called.

3.1.8.6 Customer

Reviewed keys management plan and accelerated rollout.